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THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE-
ITS APPLICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
SUMMARY 
The business judgment rule is used by American courts to establish whether a director has 
fulfilled his duty of care. It is based on the concept that the directors are legally empowered 
to manage a corporation's affairs, and the courts accordingly do not interfere with the exercise 
of those powers unless a board's action is tainted by fraud or self-interest. The courts will not 
review a business decision where, acting in good faith, the board has truly applied itself to 
making an informed decision. In certain circumstances, where self-interest on the part of 
directors is more likely to be a factor, a stricter test is applied. The business judgment rule 
is implicit in the judgments of English and South African courts and the King Committee has 
recommended its formal recognition in South Africa. The need for such formal recognition 
and stricter interpretation of the duty of care and skill discussed. 
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THEBUSINESSJUDGMENTRULE-
ITS APPLICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1 Introduction and outline of the development of the rule 
Page 1 
The topic of corporate governance is one which has been the subject of discussion for some 
years. The debate, at least in the United States, started in the 1930s with the published work 
of Berle and Means1, and proceeded by way of Ralph Nader's consumerism2 in the 1970s; the 
attempts at codifying United States law3, undertaken by the American Law Institute and the 
American Bar Association have evoked much comment, not all of it favourable. Better known 
in South Africa are the report of the Cadbury Committee4 in Britain, which dealt mainly with 
the financial aspects of corporate governance, and more recently that of the King Committee;5 
these have postulated a demand for higher standards of attention to corporate affairs, 
particularly on the part of outside or non-executive directors, as well as the role of the courts 
in ensuring that stakeholders - in the wider application of the term which is coming to be more 
generally accepted - are not prejudiced by the conduct of boards of directors. 
An aspect of COflX)rate governance which has been largely neglected in the past is the duty of 
directors to employ care and skill in carrying out their functions; although the duty has been 
recognized for some 250 years, the level of care required of a director has generally been set 
at a very low level6 . 
The existence of the duty has been generally acknowledged. In Charitable Corporation v 
Sutton the Lord Chancellor said "[b ]y accepting a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to 
171e Modem Corporation mu! Private Property (1932). 
See, eg, 171e Company State (1973); Comtitutionalizing the Corporation (1976). 
See section 4 infra. 
Report of the Committee on the Fiiw.ncial Aspects of Corporate Governance ( 1992). 
Institute of Directors 171e Ki11g Report 011 Corporate Govemance (1994). 
See below, p 7. 
10 
11 
12 
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exercise it with fidelity and reasonable diligence. "7 The existence of a similar duty, which 
stems from the common law rather than from statute, has been acknowledged by the South 
African courts in, for example, Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa v 
Jorgensen8• 
The level of application sufficient to satisfy the duty of care and skill has been widely 
discussed; these discussions are considered in section 2 below. The duty is merged by many 
American authorities with the director's fiduciary duty, but is clearly recognizable - and is 
acknowledged as such - as the duty outlined by the court in Charitable Corporation v Sutton9 • 
Among the decisions most frequently quoted in this respect is that of the court in Briggs v 
Spaulding which held that directors must act as would "ordinarily prudent and diligent men 
.. under similar circumstances ... "10 
The American courts have developed a practice, known as the business judgment rule, by 
which the conduct of directors is judged in deciding whether they have fulfilled their duty of 
care and skill. The most frequently quoted, if not the earliest, expression of this rule is to be 
found in an 1829 case, Percy v Millaudon where the court ruled that 
"the occurrence of difficulties ... which offer only a choice of measures, the adoption of a course from 
which loss ensues cannot make the [director) responsible, if the error was one into which a pn1dent man 
might have fallen. "11 
This interpretation of the limitations on the duty of care and skill were echoed by a number 
of courts in subsequent judgments. 12 In Pollitz, the rule was expressed in the following terms: 
2 Atk 400 (1742) at 402. 
1980 (4) SA !56 \'N) at 165-6; see also Cronje NO v Stone 1985 (3) SA 597 (D; Howard v Herrigel NO 
1991 (2) SA 660 (A). 
supra. See Block et al T71e Business Judgment Rule (1987) 1. 
141 US 132 (cited in Block, supra at 1). 
8 Mart ns 68 (La 1829) at 77-78. 
See eg, GodboUI v Branch Bank 11 Ala 191 (1847); Hodges v New Englmui Screw Co 3 RI 9 (1853); Smith 
v Prattville Mfg Co 29 Ala 603 (1857); Pollitz v Wabash Railroad Co 207 NY 113, 100 NE 721 (1912). 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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"[1be business judgement mle) bars judicial enquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith 
and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes." 13 
In spite of the courts' recognition of the duty of care, the standard of enforcement has been 
low14 having reached the position where according to some writers, any judicial responsible 
for enforcing the duty has been totally abdicated. 15 This view has also been advanced in 
relation to the English courts. 16 
However, certain decisions in the 1980' s17 have suggested that the American courts are 
prepared to recognize the duty and enforce it in appropriate cases. The collapse of many 
Savings and Loan institutions in the same period has drawn further attention to the need for 
higher standards of conduct by directors. 18 
The majority of American reported judgments on corporate law subjects originate from the 
courts of the state of Delaware. The Delaware legislature is widely regarded as being in the 
forefront of the development of corporate law, and consequently many large corporations are 
incorporated in that state. Second in importance are the courts of the state of New York - New 
York City being the major centre of banking and other financial activities in the United States. 
supra at 724, cited with approval in Auerbach v Bennett 47 NY 2d 619, 629, 393 NE 2d 994, 1000, 419 
NYS 2d 920, 926 (1979). 
See eg Bishop JW "Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers" 77 Yale Law Jounwl 1078, 1099 (1968) : "The search for cases in which directors 
of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a large haystack." Or, as perhaps more simply 
(and more recently) expressed by the US Supreme Court in Joy v North (F 2d 880 at 885 (2d Cir 1982)): 
" ... the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors simply for bad judgment ... " 
An article which sets out to illustrate this point and suggests some possible solutions is Cohn SR "Demise 
of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions through the Business 
Judgment Rule" (1983) 62 Texas Law Review 591. 
Parkinson JE, Corporate Power mu/ Responsibility ( 1993), particularly §4, 97-113. 
Revlon v McAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del 1986); Ha1ZS011 Trust plc v ML SCM 
Acquisiti01i Inc 781 F 2d 264 (2nd Cir 1986); 'Zapata Corp v Mal;/onado 430 A 2d 779 (Del 1981) ; 
Treadway v Care bulustries 490 F Supp 668, on appeal as 638 F 2d 357 (2nd Cir 1980). 
See, eg, FSUC v Huff704 P 2d 372 (Kan 1985) and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act, 1989. 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
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The King Committee has recommended that something similar to the business judgment rule 
be introduced in South Africa19 and it becomes appropriate to consider the nature and content 
of the rule and how the American courts and commentators have viewed its application over 
the years. Similar principles have been adopted in other jurisdictions and these must also 
considered in attempting to predict the impact on South African corporate law. 
2 The content and nature of the rule 
The American courts have been remarkably consistent m their statement of the business 
judgment rule. The case of Percy v Millaudon20 , decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
1829, used words which do not differ in substance from those used 150 years later. The most 
commonly cited recent statement of the rule appears in Aronson v Lewis21 , where the Delaware 
Supreme Court said: 
The business judgment nile is an acknowledgement of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware 
directors under Section 14l(a). See 7.apata Corp v Maldonado 430 A 2d at 782. It is a 
presrnnption that in making a lu~iness decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company. Kaplan v Centex Corp Del Ch 284 A 2d 119, 124 (1971); Robimo11 v Pittsburgh Oil 
Refinery Corp Del Ch 126 A 46 (1926). Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be 
respected by the courts.:?:! 
This exposition of the rule has been cited with approval in many subsequent cases. 23 
Most American writers state that the common law business judgment rule contains four 
elements - some authorities suggest five24 • The four elements are clearly set out by the 
Chapter 5 para 3.4. 
Supra, p 2 n 10. 
473 A 2d 805 (Del 1984). 
At 812. 
See, eg, Revlon Inc v MacA1ulrews and Forbes Holdings Inc 506 A 2d 173, 180 (Del 1986); Ivanhoe 
Partners v Newmont Mining Corp 535 A 2d 1334, 1341 (Del 1989); In re JP Stevem & Co Inc 542 A 2d 
770, 780 (Del Ch 1988); Citron v Fairchild Camera & Instrument 569 A 2d 53, 64 (Del 1989). 
Eg, Block, Barton & Rodin 711e Business Judgment Rule - Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and 
Officers ( 1987) § 1. B pp 9-17. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
American Law Institute in its Corporate Governance Project25 : 
(a) the absence of personal interest or self-<lealing, 
(b) an informed decision, which reflects a reasonable effort (subject to pennitted reliance upon 
the advice and efforts of others) to become familiar with the relevant and available facts, as well 
as an actual decision, 
(c) a reasonable belief that the decision serves the interests of the corporation, and 
(d) good faith. 26 
Page 5 
The fifth element, that the director must exercise his powers in the honest belief that he acts 
in the best interests of his company, and must not abuse his discretion, is no more, it is 
suggested, than an extension of the duty of good faith. 27 
In order to understand the rule, it is necessary to consider the context in which it operates, and 
the rationale for its existence. 
The duties of directors and officers of corporations are of a fiduciary nature28 - in other words, 
they "owe to the corporation and its shareholders the duty of honesty, loyalty, good faith, 
• - 4 "' 
diligence and fairness; they must act for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders, and 
never use their fiduciary positions to further their personal interests. "29 While the English 
courts and commentators have traditionally divided a director's common law duties into a duty 
of good faith or loyalty and a duty of care and skill30 , their American counterparts at times 
Corporate Govenwnce Project: Analysis mu/ Recomme1Ufatiom (proposed final draft 1990); see also Special 
Project Note "The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals: Reform or Restatement?" (1987) 
40 Vmulerhilt law Review 693. 
At 717-718. 
Block et al, op cit, § l.B.5. 
Bosworth v Allen 168 NY 157, 61 NE 163; Bodell v General Gas mui Electric Corp 132 A 442, 446 (Del 
Ch 1926). 
Singer v Magnavox Co 380 A 2d 969 (Del 1977), cited in Panter v Marshall Field & Co 486 F Supp 1168, 
1194 (ND Ill 1980). 
See eg, Farrar et al Farrar's Company Law 3 ed (1991) 390; Gower Principles of Modem Company Law 
5 ~I (1992) 585-589; and (in a South African context) Cilliers et al Corporate Law 2 ed (1992) §10.07, p 
134; Van Dorsten Rights Powers wul Duties of Directors (1992) §6.10, p 171; Pretorius et al Hahl.o's South 
"'• 
31 
32 
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appear to group them all under the category of fiduciary duties31 • The distinction may for 
many purposes appear academic, but the American approach has led to the inclusion in the 
business judgment rule of three elements which, had the English approach been followed, 
could have been excluded. 
The elements of disinterestedness and good faith, in which latter we may include the director's 
duty to act in what he honestly believes to the best interests of his corporation, if categorized 
under the heading of fiduciary duties (in the English sense), would not need to be referred to, 
since the business judgment rule in fact applies only to the director's compliance with the duty 
of care and skill. These elements of the rule, as expressed by the American commentators -
elements (a), (c) and (d) of the American Law Institute's description of the common law rule 
referred to32 - will therefore not be discussed in detail in this review. Suffice it to say that, if 
the duties of good faith and loyalty are breached, then any consideration of the duty of care 
and skill is irrelevant. The American courts have themselves expressed this by describing the 
duty of good faith as a hurdle which must be cleared by the plaintiff before a court will even 
consider whether the business judgment rule is applicable33 • The situation may be considered 
analogous to charging a director with fraud or with negligence - if he is guilty of fraud, a 
defence that he carried out his duties with due diligence will not assist him. 
The business judgment rule must therefore be considered primarily in the context of an action 
against a director, or a board of directors, for loss to the corporation or its shareholders caused 
by a failure to fulfil the director's duty of care and skill. 
African Company Law through the Cases 5 ed (1991) 375-378 .. 
Block, Barton & Rcxlin The Business Jutlgme1u Rule - Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors aru1 Officers 
(1987) I: Lewis CD "1l1e Busine<>s Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement" 
(\970) 22 Baylm· Law Review 157,161; Hanson Trust pie v ML SCM Acquisirio11 Inc 781 F 2d 264, 274 (2d 
Cir 1986) ("[T]he exercise of fiduciary duties by a corporate board includes more than avoiding fraud, bad 
faith and self-dealing. Directors must exercise their 'honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate 
furtherance of corporate purposes' Auerbach {v Bennett] 419 NYS 2d 926, 393 NE 2d R 1000." 
Supra. p 5 n 25. 
Joy v North 692 F 2d 880, 886 (2d Cir 1982); Aronson v Lewis 473 A 2d 805, 812 (Del 1984); Unocal 
Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 492 A 2d 946, 958 (Del 1985); Hanson Trust plc v ML SCM Acquisition Inc 
781F2d 264, 274 (2d Cir 1986). 
34 
35 
36 
7'7 
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The duty of care and skill has been the subject of much discussion. English cases until 
relatively recently14 demonstrate a reluctance to impose on directors any duty which could be 
regarded in a serious light; so an infant of six months could be appointed chairman of the 
board of directors and attend only a single board meeting in 38 years, and still escape liability 
for the mismanagement of the company by certain of the directors and managers35 • Numerous 
examples of this nature are to be found in the commentaries. In the United States, a director 
was placed under no more strenuous obligations. In what was admittedly an extreme case, two 
directors of a bank who were found to be of "unsound mind during the entire time they were 
on the board" were held not to be liable for the negligent conduct of their co-directors. 36 It 
is interesting to note that many of the cases in which the conduct of directors was challenged 
on the grounds of lack of due care (in both countries) concerned directors of banks - an area 
where one would logically expect a greater degree of care to be required of directors. The 
lack of insistence on even a limited standard of care on the part of directors has drawn much 
comment from academic writers37 , and it was not until Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing38 
in England and Smith v Van Gorkom39 in America that the courts began to give more serious 
consideration to this aspect of what has now come to be styled "corporate governance". 
The rationale for the business judgment rule is simple. A successful business requires directors 
who can react quickly to changing market needs and technological developments; business is 
about taking risks, and directors must be able to take risks without fear of their conduct being 
judged, to their financial prejudice, by hindsight. If a director faced the possibility of a 
See eg Overe1ul, Guniey & Co v Gibb wul Gibb (1872) LR 5 HL 480; Lagwws Nitrate Co v Lagunns 
Sy1ulicate [1899] 2 Ch 392; Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations wul Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425 . 
Re Cardiff Savings Bank (I1ie Marquess of Bure's Case) [1892] Ch 100. 
A1ulerson v Akers 7 F Supp 924 (WD Ky 1934). 
Eg Parkinson Cmporate Power wul Re.1pon.s1biliry (1993) 97-113; Soderquist LD "The Proper Standard for 
Directors' Negligence Liability" (1990) 66 Norre Dame Law Review 37; Gower Principles of Modem 
Company Law 5 ed (1992) 585-586; Mace Direcrors, Myth aiul Reality (1971) (directors who are 
"adornments to the corporate Christmas tree"). 
[ 1989] BCLC 498. It is interesting to note that although this case was decided in 1977, it was not 
considered of sufficient importance to be reported until 12 years later. 
488 A 2<l 858 (Del 1985). 
40 
41 
43 
44 
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negligence action whenever he made an honest mistake, few competent persons would be 
willing to take on the office. As long ago as 1847, the Alabama Supreme Court, in God hold 
v Branch Bank, expi:essed its opinion that "no man of ordinary prudence would accept a trust 
surrounded by such perils. "40 After Van Gorkom, corporate America, together with many 
academic lawyers, threw up its hands in horror41 • It would be difficult, if not impossible, for 
public corporations to recruit directors who were prepared to subject themselves to a stricter 
regime of liability, and the cost in terms of indemnity premiums would be astronomical. 
Moves were made to introduce statutory limits on directors' liability for neg1igence42 • 
Nevertheless, the courts continued to tighten the screw43, particularly in those cases where "the 
omnipresent specter [arises] that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather 
than those of the corporation and its shareholders. "44 
The business judgment rule is an extension of the principle that a corporation is managed by 
its directors, under powers given by its founding statutes, or by statutory provision. 45 The 
selection of the directors is in the hands of the shareholders (technically, at least). It would 
therefore be "unfair, and ultimately counterproductive, to allow shareholders to elect directors 
11Ala191, 199 (1847). 
See Scx!erquist & SonmIBr U1ulersta1uli11x Corporatio11 Law (1990) 168-169 and the references there cited; 
FisclIBl DR "Tiie Business JtKlgment Rule and the Tram Union Case" (1985) 40 Business Lawyer 1437 ("one 
of the worst decisions in tlIB history of corporate law"); Manning B "Reflections and Practical Tips on Life 
in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom" (1985) 41 Business Lawyer I; Veasey NE & Seitz JMS "The Business 
1tKlgment Rule in the Revised Mex.lei Act, the Tram Union Case, and the ALI Project - A Strange Porridge" 
(1985) 63 Texa~ Law Review 1483; Comment "Mining the Safe Harbor?: The Business Judgment Rule after 
TrallS U11io11'tl985) I 0 DeW.ware J Corp L 545; Prickett W "An Explanation of Tram Union to 'Henny-
Penny' and her Friends" (1985) 10 Dewware J Corp L 451. 
Eg Delaware General Corporation Law (C 8) §102(h)(7). 
Particularly in U1wcal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985); Moran v Household bit'! Inc 
500 A 2d 1346 (Del 1985); Revlon v MacA1ulrews mu/ Forbes H0Mi11g~ Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del J 986); 
Hamon Tm~t pie v ML SCM Acquisition Inc 781 F 2d 264 (2d Cir 1986); In re JP Srevem & Co !lu· 542 
A 2d 770 (Del Ch 1988); !wmlwe Partners v Newmont Mining Corp 535 A 2d 1334 (Del 1989); Milli· 
Acquisition Co v Macmillan Inc 559 A 2d 1261 (Del 1988); Citron v FairchiUI Camera & Imtrument Co 
569 A 2d 53 (Del 1989); Gilbert v El P(L\'O Co 575 A 2d 1131(Del1990)-
Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A 2d 946, 954 (Del 1985). See the discussion in the following 
chapter. 
eg 8 Del C § l4l(a); see Pogostin v Rice 480 A 2d 619, 624 (Del 1984); Citron v FairchiUI Camera & 
lmtrument 569 A 2d 53, 64 (Del 1989). 
46 
47 
48 
49 
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of their choosing and then to collect damages from those directors when their judgment - as 
opposed to their honesty and diligence - proves faulty. "46 
The second leg of the rationale for the business judgment rule is formed by the belief that the 
courts are ill-equipped to take upon themselves the role of business decision makers. The 
Delaware Chancery Court expressed the matter eruditely: 
Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and 
judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is great social utility in encouraging 
the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assumption of economic risk by those with such skill 
and infonnRtion, courts have long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear 
to have been made in good faith. 47 
The corollary to this principle is that directors who constantly show poor business judgment 
will become an unmarketable commodity, whereas judges are under no such pressure. 
Managers who mRke such judgment calls poorly ultimately give way to superior executives; no 
such mecllRilism 'selects out' judges who try to make business decisions. In the long nm firms are 
better off when business decisions are made by business specialists, even granting the inevitable 
errors. 48 
Having eliminated three of the four elements, we are left with the core of the rule - the 
statement that "[directors] enjoy a presumption [in making business decisions] of sound 
business judgment .... which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be 
attributed to their decisions" .49 
This remaining element of the rule itself contains a number of sub-elements. 
The use of the word "presumption" raises the question of the nature of the rule. A review of 
Soderquist & Sommer U1ulerstmuling Corporation Law (1990) 173. 
So/ash v Tele.x Corp (Del Ch Jan 19, 1988) cited in In re JP Stevens & Co Inc 542 A 2d 770, 780 (Del Ch 
1988). 
Kamen v Kemper Financial Services Inc 908 F 2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir 1990), cited in Block, Radin and 
Barton, The Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, in Directors' mul Officers' 
Liability 1993 71. 
Panter v Marshall FieUI & Co 486 F Supp 1168, 1994 (ND Ill 1980). 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
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authoritative pronouncements attempting to answer the question reveals a confusion which is 
perhaps more apparent than real. In Citron v Fairchild Camera and Instrument Co, the 
Delaware Supreme Court said "[t]he rule operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and 
a substantive rule of law. "50 Two leading writers have expressed their view in the following 
words: "The business judgment rule is a judicial standard for the review of corporate 
decisionmaking"51 ; and, "The business judgment rule is thus a tool of judicial review rather 
than a standard of conduct. "52 The practical application of these concepts is discussed when 
considering the application of the rule. 
At least one writer'3 distinguishes between the business judgment rule, which normally 
prevents courts from reviewing board decisions, and the business judgment doctrine, which 
protects the decisions themselves from judicial interference. There appears to be little practical 
value in the distinction, and the courts themselves use the two terms interchangeably. 54 
The definition of the rule refers to the making of business decisions. By extrapolation, it 
offers no protection in those cases where a board does not make a decision. In Aronson v 
Lewis the court said: 
fnt should be noted that the brn;iness judgment mle operates only in the context of director action. 
Technically speaking, it has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent 
a con<>ciotL'> decision, failed to act. But it also follows that under applicable principles, a conscious 
decision to refrain from acting may nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy 
569 A 2d 53, 64 (Del 1989). 
Bradbury SG "Corporate Auction<> and Directors' Fiduciary Duties - A Third-Generation Business Judgment 
Rule" (1988) 87 Michigan Law Review 276, 280. 
Block DJ, Radin SA & Barton NR "TI1e Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Litigation" 
in Directors' mu/ Officers' LialJility 1993 68. 
Hinsey J "Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, 
the Doctrine and the Reality" (1984) 52 Geo Washington Law Review 609; see also Veasey NE "New 
Insights into Judicial Deference to Directors' Business Decisions: Should We Tmst the Courts?" (1984) 39 
Business Lawyer 1461 1462. 
See eg, Hanson Trust plc v ML SCM Acquisition Inc 781 F 2d 264 (2d Cir 1986) which refers to "the 
business judgment rnle" (at 273) and "the business judgment doctrine" (at 274) without any apparent 
distinction. Citron v Fairchil.d Camera arul Instrument Co 569 A 2d 53 (Del 1989) refers to the business 
judgment rule as protecting "the directors and the decisions they make" (at 64). 
55 
56 
57 
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h . f I 1 55 t e protection o t 1e m e. 
The second part of the above citation casts an important light on the true content of the rule; 
there must be a conscious decision. If, having fully considered a particular matter, a board 
takes a decision not to act, that decision will enjoy the protection of the rule. This reflects the 
basic tenet of the rule - directors' fulfilment of their duty of care and skill is judged by the 
procedure they adopt when taking business decisions, not by the content of their decisions. 56 
The next step in the inquiry into the content of the rule is therefore what standards of conduct 
a director is required to satisfy, and there are differences between the jurisdictions and, in 
some cases, between statutory law and the common law. The principle laid down by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery in Graham v Allis-Chalmers Mfg Co57 reflects the approach most 
commonly adopted: "Directors of a corporation in managing corporate affairs are bound to use 
that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances"58 • This standard was adopted by the American Law Institute in its Corporate 
Governance Project. 59 The Project recognizes the historical corporate governance debate, in 
the context of the propensity of managers of large corporations to usurp the control functions 
of the stockholders, and seeks to coordinate the various proposals for reform and to compile 
a single Act which may be used as a model for reforming state corporate law. The Project is 
divided into seven sections dealing with: 
(1) definitions; 
(2) objectives and conduct of the business corporation; 
(3) structure of the corporation; 
(4) duty of care and the business judgment rule; 
473 A 2d 805, 813 (Del 1984). 
See Bradbury SG "Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties - A Third-Generation Business 
Judgment Rule" (1988) 87 Michiga11 Law Review 276: "The traditional nile protects from liability 
disinterested directors who have, in the exercise of their business judgment, satisfied the standards of 
conduct required ... " (at 281). 
41 Del Ch 89, 188 A 2d 125 (1963). 
At 130. 
Special Project Note "The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals: Reform or Re;;tatement?" 
(1987) 40 VQ/ulerbilt Law Review 693, 711. 
60 
61 
62 
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(5) duty of loyalty; 
(6) transactions in control; 
(7) remedies. 60 
The Institute considered that a less rigorous standard than simple negligence was required, 
since such a standard could JX)tentially imjX)se liability on a director for any incorrect decision. 
This view was expressed by the court in Stern v Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School 
for Deaconesses and Missionaries: 
Both tm~tees and corporate directors are liable for losses caused by their negligent mismanagement 
of inve.~tments. However, the degree of care required appears to differ in many jurisdictions. A 
trnstee is unifonnly held to a high standard of care and negligence, while a director must often 
have committed "gross negligence" or otherwise be guilty of more than mere mistakes of 
. d 61 Jll grnent. 
The standard of conduct required is emphasized in Aron.son v Lewis: 
While the Delaware case.~ have not been precise in articulating the standard by which the exercise 
of husine.~s judgment is governed, a long line of Delaware cases holds that director liability is 
predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.62 
The standard of gross negligence adopted by the Delaware courts was confirmed in Smith v 
Van Gorkom6.1• In this case, which is frequently referred to as the Trans Union case, Jerome 
W Gorkom, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Trans Union, negotiated a merger 
agreement in respect of the corporation. He called a meeting of directors at a day's notice to 
approve the agreement. Immediately prior to the board meeting, he called a meeting of senior 
management to advise them of the proposed merger. At that stage only the president of the 
corporation and one other manager were aware of the proposal. The reaction of senior 
management was almost entirely negative. 
At the subsequent board meeting, Van Gorkom made a twenty minute oral presentation. 
Copies of the merger agreement were not made available to the directors in time for study, and 
Special Project Note "The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals : Refonn or 
Restatement?" (1987) 40 Vmulerbilt Law Review 693. 
381 F Supp 1003 (DCC 1974). 
473 A 2<l 805 (Del 1984) at 812 n 6. 
488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985) at 873: "We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for 
detennining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed one." 
64 
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no information was given as to how the proposed price for Trans Union's stock had been 
established, nor were the corporation's bankers or financial advisers present at the meeting, 
or even consulted. The corporation's chief financial officer, who was not a director, told the 
directors that he had not been aware of the proposal until the morning of the meeting, and that 
he could not confirm that the price offered was a fair one until he had a chance to study the 
matter further. Nevertheless, after a two hour meeting, the directors resolved to approve the 
merger, the agreement being executed by Van Gorkom in the course of a social function that 
same evening. Van Gorkom later signed a number of amendments without further reference 
to the board and the transaction was ratified at a meeting of stockholders some four months 
later. Certain aggrieved stockholders brought an action against the directors for negligence 
in approving the merger. 
In dismissing the action, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that the directors had acquired 
sufficient information during the four month period between the board approval and the 
ratification by the stockholders to satisfy themselves that the deal was fair to stockholders, and 
had thus fulfilled the requirements of the business judgment rule. 
On review, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the stockholders' claim and awarded 
substantial damages. The Supreme Court found that the trial court had erred in finding that 
the directors had fulfilled their duty of care and attention by not informing themselves 
sufficiently of the Chairman's role in forcing the merger, and in establishing the true value of 
the corporation's stock. There had been no need for the board meeting to be held at such short 
notice or for the decision to approve the merger being taken after a comparatively short 
discussion, without the advice of the company's financial advisers and contrary to the opinions 
of senior management. The fact that information had subsequently been obtained and the 
decision ratified by the stockholders was irrelevant. 
Part of the director's duty of care is the duty to inform himself'4, to the extent that he 
Hanson Trust pie v ML SCM Acquisition Inc 781 F 2d 264, 274. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
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reasonably believes necessary in the circumstances65 , about the business of the company in 
general66 , and about the matter under discussion in particular. 67 Some writers have elevated 
the "duty to be informed" to the status of a separate duty; it is probably more correct to 
consider its fulfilment as part of the duty of care and skill, or of diligence, required to be 
exercised by a director or officer. The duty to be informed has been formulated in at least one 
statute. 68 
The rule may thus be summarized as protecting a director who has taken a business decision 
after proper inquiry and deliberation from liability for the consequences of such decision. 
3 The application of the rule 
It has already been noted69 that the business judgment rule has been held to operate as both a 
presumption and as a substantive rule of law. As a presumption, it places on the party seeking 
to attach liability to the directors the onus of proving that circumstances exist, which prevent 
the application by the court of the substantive rule that it will not interfere with the decision-
making process of corporate directors. In Cirron v Fairchild Camera & Instrument, the court 
said: 
"The burden falls upon the proponent of a claim to rebut the presumption by introducing evidence either of 
director self-interest, if not self-<lealing, or that the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise 
due care. 
If the proponent fails to meet her burden of establishing facts rebutting the presumption, the business 
judgment mle, as a substantive rnle of law, will attach to protect the directors and the decisions they 
make .• 70 
American Law lnstitute: Special Project Note "The Corporate Governance Debate and the ALI Proposals: 
Refonn or Restatement?" (1987) 40 Vaiuierbilt Law Review 693, 715. 
Hanson Tm~t PLC v ML SCM Acquisition Inc 781 F 2d 264, 274; Francis v United Jersey Ban.k 432 A 2d 
814, 821-22 (NJ 1981). 
Stem v Lucy Webb Hayes Nation.al Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries 38 l F Supp 1003 
(DCC 1974). "A director who fails to acquire the information necessary ... has violated his fiduciary duty 
to the corporation." (at 1013) 
California Corporation Code§ 3.09(a). 
Supra, pp 6 -7. 
569 A 2d 53, 64 (Del 1989); see afro Puma v Marriott 283 A 2d 693, 695 (Del Ch 1971); Aronson v Lewis 
473 A 2d 805, 812 (Del 1984); Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858, 873 (Del 1985); Revlon Inc v 
MacA1uirews mu/ Forbes HoU/ings 506 A 2d 173, 180 n 10 (Del 1986); Hinsey J "Business Judgment and 
the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, The Doctrine and the Realitytt 
71 
n 
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If it were accepted that the business judgment rule applied only to the exercise of a director's 
duty of care and skill, the presumption would not arise in the case of an alleged breach of the 
director's fiduciary duty (as defined by the English authorities); it would merely be necessary 
for the applicant to allege that a director acted in bad faith or out of self-interest. The onus 
would of course remain on the applicant to prove the alleged facts, if denied by the director, 
but the applicant would not be faced with the additional burden of overcoming a presumption 
in favour of the respondent. 71 
There are however, in broad terms, two sets of special circumstances which restrict the 
application of the rule as a presumption in favour of the allegedly negligent director. 
Where the board of a corporation takes steps in face of a hostile take-over, it is logical to 
expect the courts to protect these steps in terms of the business judgment rule. In Unocal Corp 
v Mesa Perroleum Co the Delaware Supreme Court endorsed this view: 
"When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an obligation to detennine whether the offer is in 
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board's duty is no different from 
any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they would 
otherwise be accorded in the realm of business judgment. .n 
However, the court in the same case drew attention to the need to be particularly vigilant in 
those cases where there is a possibility that the directors may be acting in their own interests 
rather than those of the corporation and the stockholders in general. 73 
The action in Unocal was brought by a minority shareholder who had made a hostile takeover 
bid, and sought the prevent the corporation resisting his bid by, in effect, tendering for its own 
shares. Unocal has become a benchmark case in establishing the responsibilities of directors 
in takeover situations and the court's duty to establish whether there are special circumstances 
excluding the application of the business judgment rule. The court commenced by examining 
(1984) 52 Geo Wa1·hi11gto11 Uiw Review 609, 611-613. 
See Federal Rules of Evidence §301. 
493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985) at 954. 
At 954. See supra p 5, n 43. 
74 
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the directors' power to take steps to resist a takeover bid. It established clearly that, without 
such power, "[n]either issues of fairness nor business judgment are pertinent. "74 Having 
concluded that the directors were indeed authorised by the inherent powers conferred by the 
Delaware General Corporations Law75 , and by their "fundamental duty and obligation to 
protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, 
irrespective of its source. "76 
The court then set out the procedure it should adopt to satisfy itself that the directors are prima 
facie entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule: 
"Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than 
those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination 
at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rnle may be conferred. 
This Court has long recognized that: 
We nuL~t bear in mind the inherent (!anger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds 
to remove a threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors 
are of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is 
difficult. 
Bemiett v Propp Del Su pr 187 A 2d 405, 409 ( 1962). In the face of this inherent conflict directors must 
show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
existed because of another person's stock ownership. Cheff v Mathes 199 A 2d at 554-55. However, they 
satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation .... " Id at 555 . • n 
It appears from this decision of the Delaware Supreme Court that, in a takeover situation, the 
onus is on the directors to show that they exercised good faith, carried out reasonable 
investigation, and that the course of action resolved upon was "reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed . .. n However, the court had previously stated: "We will not substitute our views 
At 953. 
8 Del C § 141 (a), and more specifically the power of a corporation to deal in its own stock contained in 
§ ! 60(a). 
At 954. The court referred, in particular, to Panter v Marshall Fieul & Co 646 F 2d 271, 297 (7th Cir 
1981); Crouse-Hi1uls & Co v lnlenwrth bic 634 F 2d 690, 704 (2d Cir 1980); Heit v Baird 567 F 2d 1157, 
1161 (!st Cir 1977); 01eff v Mathes 199 A 2d 548, 556 (Del 1964); Martin v American Potash & Chemical 
Corp 92 A 2d 295, 302 (Del Ch 1952); Kaplan v Goldsamt 380 A 2d 556, 568-569 (Del Ch 1977); Kors 
v Carey 158 A 2d 136, 141 (Del Ch 1960); Northwest bulustries Inc v BF Goodrich 301FSupp706, 712 
(MD Ill 1969); and Johnson v Trueblood 629 F 2d 287, 292-293 (3d Cir 1980). 
493 A 2d 946 at 954-955. 
ld at 955. 
80 
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for those of the board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business 
purpose'"79, which appears to broaden the test of reasonableness somewhat. The approach of 
the court in Unocal has been approved in a number of subsequent judgments. 80 
The other circumstances under which a need arises for the court to be convinced of the 
applicability of the business judgment rule, given the enhanced probability that the directors 
are acting out of self-interest, occur when the board, or a duly authorised committee of the 
board, resolves on the desirability of continuing with a derivative action by a shareholder. In 
most American jurisdictions, a shareholder wishing to bring an action on behalf of the 
corporation of which he is a member, usually an action against the directors for breach of their 
fiduciary duties (including, in the American model, the duty of care and skill), must first 
demand of the directors that they bring such action in the name of the corporation. Only if 
they refuse or fail to bring the action may he himself approach the courts. 81 
Logically, as in the case of opposition to a takeover, a decision by the directors not to continue 
with a derivative suit should enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, assuming it 
satisfies the requirements of the rule. However, the possibility of a conflict of interests, where 
directors have to rule on the desirability of bringing suit against some of their own number, 
cannot be regarded as merely illusory. As the Circuit Court said in Joy v North, "The ... 
fiduciary obligations of directors ... can hardly be said to exist if the sole enforcement method 
can be eliminated on a recommendation of the defendant's appointees". 82 
In Auerbach v Bennerr83 the New York Court of Appeals held that the court's obligation 
At 949, citing Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien 280 A 2d 717, 720 (Del 1971). 
See eg Revlon Inc v MacA1ulrews OJU! Forbes HoU/ings Inc 506 A 2d 173, 180 (Del 1986); Ivanhoe Partn.ers 
v Newmont Minint:: Corp 535 A 2d 1334, 1341 (Del 1987); Mill~ Acquisition Co v Macmillan Inc 559 A 
2d 1261, 1279 (Del 1988); Gilbert v El Paso Co 575 A 2d 1131, 1134 (Del 1990). 
Joy v North 692 F 2d 880, 888 (2d Cir 1982). See also Block DJ and Pnissin HA "Termination of 
Derivative Suits against Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson" (1984) 39 
Business Lawyer 1503 at 1508-1513. 
Id at 889. 
47 NY 2d, 419 NYS 2d, 393 NE 2d 994 (1979). 
84 
85 
86 
87 
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extended no further than was necessary to determine whether the board or committee had acted 
independent1y, di1igent1y and in good faith. Otherwise, the business judgment ru1e would 
apply, and the court would not review the substance of the decision. The Delaware Supreme 
Court expressly refused to adopt the business judgment rationa1e in such circumstances. In 
Zapata Corp v Maldonado it established a two-step analysis: 
"First, the Court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases 
supporting its conch1Sion~ .... The corporation should have the burden of proving independence, good faith 
and a rea.~onable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and reasonableness. If the 
Court determines either that the committee is not independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its 
conclusions, or, if the Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but not 
limited to the go<XI faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation's motion {to dismiss the 
shareholder's action] .... [As thej second step ... the Court should determine, applying its own business 
judgment, whether the motion should be granted .... The second step is intended to thwart instances where 
corporate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where 
corporate actions would simply premature!J' tenninate a stockholder grievance deserving of further 
consideration in the corporation's interest. "8 
The same court, in Aronson v Lewis85 limited the application of the two-step test in Zapata by 
ruling that it only applied to demand excused cases - those cases where the plaintiff could 
approach the court directly, without first requiring the directors to institute action in the name 
of the corporation, on the grounds that the directors were not disinterested and that demand 
wou1d therefore be futi1e. As expressed in Aronson, demand is only excused where the 
plaintiff can show self-dealing on the part of the directors. 86 
Cases in other jurisdictions show a variety of approaches. In Miller v Register & Tribune 
Syndicate Inc, 87 the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that directors who are defendants in a derivative 
action may not appoint a special litigation committee, as even the appointment would be 
tainted with self-interest. The court claimed to follow the recommendations of the American 
Law Institute that litigation committees must be appointed by disinterested directors. 88 
430 A 2d 779, 788-789 (1981) (citations omitted). 
473 A 2d 805 (Del 1984). 
Special Project Note (1987) 40 Vmulerbilt L Rev 633. 
336 NW 2d 709 (Iowa 1983). 
gg !ti at 717. 
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The North Carolina case of Afford v Shaw89 is an interesting one; the district court ruled that 
the business judgment rule applied to the decisions of a special litigation committee and 
dismissed the action; on appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed, and the court 
applied Miller9°. The Supreme Court, on further appeal, reversed the decision of the appeal 
court, and in doing so approved Auerbach91 , in which the business judgment rule was applied 
in the traditional manner, excluding the court's power to review a board decision; Zapata, 
which it ruled did not apply to the current case, as it was not a demand excused application; 
and Miller, which it rejected on the surprising grounds that it was not "in the best interests" of 
North Carolina's corporate community. The court applied Auerbach, making it more onerous 
for the defendant directors by ruling that the onus of proving disinterestedness rested on such 
defendant directors. 92 
The United States Court of Appeals, asked in Joy v North to decide between following 
Auerbach or Maldonado, approved, in a majority judgment, the two-step approach adopted by 
the Delaware court, which it called an "independent business judgment" test. In the course of 
his judgment, Winter CJ considered the fact that part of the rationale for the business judgment 
rule was that judges are not the best makers of business judgments, even by hindsight93 • He 
considered that this rationale could scarcely apply to the evaluation of the recommendations 
of special litigation committees appointed by boards of directors: 
"[T]he difficulties courts face in evaluation of business decisions are considerably less in the case of 
recommendations of special litigation committees. The relevant decision - whether to continue litigation -
is at hand and the danger of deceptive hindsight simply does not exist. Moreover, it can hardly be argued 
that tenninating a lawsuit is an area in which courts have no special aptitude. "9' 
In the event, the court went beyond Maldonado and held that "the court must proceed to apply 
its own business judgment rather than leaving the decision to resort to the second step within 
89 349 SE 2d 41 (1986). 
90 324 SE 2d 878, 881 (NC 1985). 
91 Supra. 
92 349 SE 2d 41, 50 (NC 1985). 
93 Supra pp 8 - 9. 
94 692 F 2d 880, 888 (2d Cir 1982). 
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the trial court's discretion. "95 
In a later decision the United States Court of Appeals, applying New York law, held that the 
normal application of the business judgment rule must be followed; since the rule presumed 
that directors had acted properly, the burden of proof must rest on the party alleging absence 
of disinterestedness on the part of the directors, even· in a derivative suit situation. 96 
4 Codification of the rule 
The director's duty of care and skill has been codified in the majority of American states. 97 
Most codifications are based on §8.30(a) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act98 : 
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee: 
(I) in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily pnK!ent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation. 
However, no state has yet codified the business judgment rule, and at least one has effectively 
removed the requirement of the exercise of care and skill by a director, restricting liability to 
cases where a director has been guilty of wilful misconduct or recklessness. 99 In spite of, or 
perhaps in reply to, the attitude of its courts to the duty of care of directors, Delaware has 
amended its General Corporation Law to permit a corporation to include in its charter a 
provision eliminating or restricting the liability of its directors for breaches of the duty of care, 
and most other states have followed suit. 100 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Id at 898 - 899. 
Hanson Trust plc v ML SCM Acquisition file 781 F 2d 264, 273 (2d Cir 1986). 
See Block et al 171e Business Ju;fgment Rule - Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and 
Officers (1987) I, and Chapter 2 §A.2. 
Frequently referred to as the "safe harbor" provision. 
Indiana C<Xle Ann §23-1-35-l(e) (1986), quoted in American Law Institute "Special Project Note: 
Recent Developments concerning the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment 
Rule" (1987) 40 Varulerhilt Law Review 631, 660. 
§!02(b)(7) (Supp 1986). See Soderquist & Sommer Understanding Corporation Law (1990) 170. 
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The American Bar Association's Corporate Laws Committee considered including the relevant 
provisions in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, but found it impossible to agree 
on a suitable draft, even after three years of debate. 101 In its Official Comment on the Revised 
Mcxlel Act, the committee concluded that the "elements of the business judgment rule and the 
circumstances for its application are continuing to be developed by the courts. . .. [The 
ccxlification of the rule] is a task to be left to the courts and possibly to later revisions of this 
Model Act." 102 
The American Law Institute's corporate governance project was intended inter alia "to propose 
desirable changes in prevailing legal norms or corporate practice where such judgments can 
be made." 103 
Unlike the American Bar Association, the recommendations of the Institute included a 
formulation of the business judgment rule. Paragraph 4.01 deals with the directorial standard 
of conduct, and paragraph 4.01 (c) is drafted as follows: 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty [of care] if: 
(1) he is not interested [as defined] in the subject of his business judgment; 
(2) he is infonned with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the extent he reasonably 
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and 
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 104 
The recommendations of the Institute have not been without their critics. The American 
Business Round Table feared that the inclusion of the word "rationally" in paragraph 4.0l(c)(3) 
would permit the courts to examine the merits of a decision to establish whether the director's 
IOI 
102 
103 
104 
Block et al. supra at 19. 
At 221. 
Principles of CorporaJe Govema11Ce mu/ Structure: Restatement mul Recomme1ulations (Tentative 
Draft Nol, April 1982) Introductory note at xxi. 
Tentative Draft No 4, Apr 12, 1985. 
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belief was m fact rational. 105 The following statement, on the other hand, 1s a clear 
endorsement of the approach adopted in the drafting of the Model Act: 
"The general conunents' suggestion that section 4.01 be implemented through state legislative action is 
unwise. The genius of the common law is well exemplified by the courts' gradual development of the 
business judgment rule. The courts' response to new developments, through the evolutionary process 
afforded hy case-by-<::aSe adjtKlication, has been heartening. Codification would create a rigidity that would 
have a chilling affect upon part-time directors and a stultifying effect upon the mle's further development 
by the courts." 106 
The writer clearly approves of, and refers to, the process of judicial development previously 
referred to in Auerbach v Bennett, Zapata Corp v Maldonado and Joy v North. 107 He also 
suggests that a director's decision making function and his oversight function should be 
separated, the former applying to a series of discrete transactions, and the latter to an ongoing 
process. The business judgment rule applies only to the decision-making process, and Hinsey 
suggests that, if it necessary to retain paragraph 4.0l(c), the introductory part should be 
redrawn to reflect this: 
"In perfonning his decision making functions, a director or officer does not violate his duty under this 
Section with respect to the consequence of a business judgment if ... " 
He also suggests that a limit be specified for sustained and unexcused inattention either to the 
performance of his functions or conscious disregard of or indifference to duties that is reckless 
under the circumstances. 
5 The director's duty of care in England 
The approach of the English courts to the director's duty of care and skill has been briefly 
outlined in the course of discussing the development of the American law relating to the 
fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers. 108 Mention has been made of some of the 
more spectacular cases in which the low level of attention to their duties required of directors 
105 
106 
107 
108 
Starement of the Business Ro111ul Table 011 the American Law lnwirute 's Proposed "Principles of 
Corporate Governance: Restatement mu/ Recomme1ulations" ( 1983), cited in Special Project Note 
(1987) 40 Vmuierbi/J Law Review 693 at 695 n 10; see also the other references there cited .. 
Hin.~ey J "BtL~iness JtKlgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the 
Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality" (1984) 52 Geo Washington Law Review 609, 618. 
Supra pp 17-19. 
Supra pp 6 -7. 
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was set out. The common law has changed little since The Marquess of Bute's Case109 or Re 
Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd, 110 in which directors of a company which 
purchased a rubber plantation were not expected to know anything about the production of 
rubber. 111 
An assessment of the common law position can be easily derived from considering the 
comments of two leading English writers on company law. 
Gower says: 
[T]here is a striking contrast between the directors' heavy duties of loyalty and good faith and their light 
obligations of skill and diligence .... The law might, no doubt, have demanded of directors a degree of 
diligence comparable to that of tnL~tees - a high degree particularly where they are paid. But the law cannot 
be too far in advance of public opinion, and public opinion has come to recognise that non-executive 
directorships are often little more than sinecures, requiring, at most, attendance at occasional board 
meetings. 112 
The latest edition of Farrar says 
This [the duty of care and skill] is an area where the common law has failed to keep pace with modem 
developments and instead presents a lamentably out of date view of directors' duties. In the past the courts 
have been reluctant to impose onerous standards of care and skill on directors and have been willing to 
impose liability only when a director's imprudence has been so great and so manifest as to amount to gross 
negligence. 113 
One commentator has referred to the standard of diligence set by the courts as "historically ... 
comically low. "114 
The degree of care and skill a director is required to exercise was laid down by the Court of 
Appeal in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co115 , and this case has been approved by many 
109 
110 
Ill 
112 
113 
114 
115 
Re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892) Ch 100, seep 7 fn 34. 
[1911) I Ch 425. 
See also Re Denham & Co (1884) 25 Ch D 752; Lagunas Nitrate Co Ltd v Lagunas Syrulicate Ltd 
[1899) 2 Ch 392. 
Principles of Modem Company Law 5 ed (1992) 585. The fact that the position has remained static 
can be readily seen from the fact that the words quoted are almost identical with those used 23 
years previously - 3 ed (1969) 549. 
Farrar, Furey & Hannigan, Farrar's Company Law 3 ed (1991) 396. 
Parkinson, Corporate Power mu/ Responsibility ( 1993) 98. 
[1925) Ch 407 CA 427 ff, per Romer J. 
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courts following English precedent, particularly in so far as they apply to non-executive 
directors. 116 The court established three guiding principles: 
(1) A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of 
skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and 
experience; 
(2) a director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of his 
company. He is not bound to attend all directors' meetings, but should attend 
whenever he is reasonably able to do so; 
(3) in respect of all duties that, having regard to the nature of the business, he is 
entitled by the articles of association or other provisions to entrust to some 
other official, he is, in the absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting 
that official to perform such duties honestly. 
The degree of care, skill and attention required of a director is thus related to the character of 
the director himself. This contrasts with the general law of negligence, where the standard 
of skill required is established objectively in relation to the act performed. 117 
Although in a case decided in 1977 where no board meetings were ever held and the two non-
executive directors took no steps to inform themselves of the managing director's (fraudulent) 
activities and those directors were consequently held liable for a breach of duty based on their 
failure to supervise the executive director's conduct, the case was not considered of sufficient 
importance to find its way into the law reports until 1989. 118 
The significant changes which have occurred in recent years in English corporate law have 
been brought about by statute. Two enactments are of particular importance: 
(1) Section 214 of the Insolvency Act, 1986. This section empowers a court to impose on 
a director of a company which has gone into insolvent liquidation personal liability for 
116 
117 
118 
See, eg, Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa v Jorgensen 1980 (4) SA 156 (N). 
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1986] 3 All ER 801: "[The] notion of a duty tailored to 
the actor, rather than the act which he elects to perform, has no place in the law of tort." (at 813, 
per Mnstill J). See alw Parkinson op cit at 103-104. 
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498. 
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the debts of the company if he is guilty of "wrongful trading". Wrongful trading is a 
new concept introduced by this Act, which did not occur in the comparable provision 
of the Companies Act, 1948, 119 and occurs when a director is, or should be, aware that 
there is no reasonable prospect of his company avoiding liquidation, and fails to take 
timeous and appropriate action to minimize the potential loss to creditors. The 
provisions are similar to those of sections 423-425 of the South African Companies 
Act120, and it remains to be seen whether they will prove as ineffective as those sections 
have been. 121 
(2) Sections 6 and 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, empower the 
court to disqualify from office a director who has been guilty of wrongful trading. In 
Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Lrd122 , it was held that, for the provisions of the Act to 
apply, the director must at least be guilty of gross negligence. 123 
The business judgment rule has never been identified as such by the English courts, although 
its existence is recognised, by academics at least, by implication. Gower refers to "an 
understandable reluctance to interfere with the directors' business judgment" 124 , while Farrar 
comments on the continuing reluctance of courts to investigate the internal management of 
companies. 125 Parkinson refers to the matter more directly: 
119 
!20 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
The ~)usiness judgment) nile ... is an articulate version of the policy of judicial reticence that is implicit in 
the practice of the English courts ... 126 
11 & 12 Geo 6 chapter 38, s 332. 
Act 61of1973. See Havenga, Michele "Creditors, Directors and Personal Liability under section 
424 of the Companies Act" (1992) 4 SA Mere LJ 63. 
See discussion below, §7; for an example of how section 214 has been applied by the English 
courts, see Re Produce Marke tint-: Comortium Ltd (No 2) [ 1989) BCLC 520. 
[1988] 2 All ER 693 ChD; [1988) BCLC 698. 
See Markgraaff JH Die 'Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986' unpub LLM dissertation, 
UNI SA ( 1987) 
Principles of Modem Company Law 5 ed (1992) 586; see note 112 at p 21. 
Farrar, Fury & Hannigan Farrar's Company Law 3 ed (1991) 396; see note 113 at p 21. 
Corporate Power wuf Responsibility (1993) 110. See also Mackenzie, A Company Director's 
Obligations of Care and Skill [ 1982) JBL 460 468. 
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That the courts have moved some way towards the normal standard of care applicable in a 
negligence action can be seen from the words of the court in Norman v Theodore Goddard, 
a case involving s 214(4) of the Insolvency Act, 1986: 
[A] director perfonning active ch1ties on behalf of the company need not exhibit a greater degree of skill than 
may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking those duties. 127 
However, the general view, expressed more than 100 yea.rs ago in Turquand v Marshall128 is 
that mismanagement should be controlled by shareholder supervision, and this, at least 
according to Parkinson, is underpinned by the provisions of section 303 of the Companies Act, 
1985, with the court's role "merely to act as a longstop" .129 The provisions of the Insolvency 
and Company Directors Disqualification Acts referred to are defensive provisions, which only 
come into play when a company is at best in serious financial difficulties, and do not give the 
courts (or shareholders) any right to deal proactively with mismanagement. 
6 The director 1s duty of care in other jurisdictions 
As might be expected, legal systems based on the common law have generally followed the 
Anglo-American pattern. The level of care and skill required of a director is generally no 
higher than that laid down by the English courts in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd130 
or by their United States counterparts in Smith v Van Gorkom. 131 
In Canada, the approach appears to be closest to that of the American courts. The level of 
attention to his duties required of a director is codified in the Canada Business Corporations 
Act, 1985 as the "care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in 
comparable circumstances" .132 Following the recommendations of the Lawrence 
127 [ 1991] BCLC 1028, 1030-31, cited by Parkinson, op cit note 113 at 103. 
128 (1869) LR 4 Ch App 376. 
129 Op cit note 113 at 104. 
130 [1925) Ch 407 (CA), supra. p 22. 
131 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985), supra p 11; see afro Millard 171e Responsib/,e Director ( 1989) 10. 
132 s 112(1). 
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Commission 133 , a higher standard was legislated in Ontario; a duty is imposed on a director 
who is not present at a board meeting to find out what business was transacted at that meeting; 
if he becomes aware of an illegal act by his company he must immediately register his dissent 
in writing. If, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he should have discovered the act 
earlier, he may still be liable. 134 A similar provision in the federal Act deems every director 
to have assented to a decision unless he expressly records his dissent in writing. 135 
At least one writer assumes that the business judgment rule will be applied by Canadian 
courts. 136 
In Australia, the director's duty of care is laid down in s 229(2) of the Corporations Code: 
An officer of a corporation shall at all times exercise a reasonable degree of care in the exercise of his 
powers and the discharge of his duties. Penalty: $5,000. 
It is interesting to note that a breach of the duty is a criminal act. It was originally the 
intention to specify a term of one year's imprisonment as the maximum penalty, but this 
aroused such an outcry that the provision was dropped. 137 Although the imposition of criminal 
sanctions appears to represent a stricter application of the duty of care, this does not appear 
to have been the case in practice. The Supreme Court of Victoria138 , applying a similar 
provision of the Uniform Companies Act1 39 (but without the penalties), held that the reference 
to "reasonable diligence" did not impose an objective test of a director's conduct, but was 
merely a statement of the principles laid down by Romer J in re City Equirable Fire Insurance 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
Report of the Committee 011 Company Law Reform in O,uario (1967). 
The Business Corporations Act, s 137. 
s 118(3). 
Wainberg Duties aiul Responsibilities of Directors in Caiiada (1975) 17 - 27. 
Business Law Education Centre, Melbourne 171e New Duties of Directors aiul Officers of 
Companies (cited in Corkery Directors' Powers and Duties (1987) 142). 
In Byme v Baker (1964) VR 443. 
s 124(1). 
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Co. 140 Recent cases, however, show a move by the courts towards applying an objective test 
to the required standard of care. 141 
In New Zealand, the law is substantially as laid down in City Equitable142 • However, the 
higher standards of diligence imposed by the Australian courts have also been reflected 
there. 143 
In the 1993 Companies Act, the duty of care was codified in terms similar to those used in the 
Australian Code: 
a director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties as a director, must exercise the care, 
diligence, and skill that a reasonahle director would exercise in the same circumstances taking into account, 
hut without limitation -
(a) The nature of the company; and 
(b) The nature of the decision; and 
(c) 111e position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities undertaken hy him or her. 144 
Jones145 suggests that this is once again likely to be interpreted by the courts as a restatement 
of the City Equ;rahle principles. In both Australia and New Zealand, increasing reference is 
made to the duty of care and skill required by a company of an employee in the performance 
of his duties, as described by the House of Lords in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage 
Co Ltd146 • This duty arises expressly or by implication out of the contract of employment. 
It is suggested that the same duty applies at least to an executive director who is an employee 
of his company. For practical purposes it is immaterial whether the duty arises from his 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
[ 1925] ChD 407 (CA); see discussion at p 22. 
StaJewide TolXU'co Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 8 ACLC 827; Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
v Friedrich mu/ Others [1991) 5 ASCR 115 187; AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 10 ACLC 933. 
[ 1925) ChD 407 (CA); see Jones Company Law in New Zealand: a Guide to the Companies Act 
1993 (1993) 108 - 110. 
National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Wom (1990) 5 NZCLC 66,384; Rea & Stowell v Jordmi 
Sarulman Were Ltd [1992) MCLR 459; Jagwar Holdings Ltd v Julian (1992) 6 NZCLC 68,040. 
s 137. 
Op cit 120. 
[ 1957] AC 555 (HL). 
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position as a director or from his status as an employee. 147 
In Ireland the position is much the same as in England, except that if a director uses a 
reasonable degree of care, diligence and skill in the conduct of his duties, and also acts bona 
fide in the interests of the company, he will not be liable for any loss occurring if the act turns 
out not to have been advantageous to the company. 148 
The position in other European countries does not vary significantly from the Common Law 
jurisdictions. Thomas remarks, regarding the law in Denmark, that "the basis of liability is 
negligence, but the standard of care does not appear to very high". 149 In France, the directors 
have a general duty to exercise their powers in good faith and with reasonable care in the best 
interests of the company150, while in Germany the Geschaft.~fiihrer must "exercise the diligence 
of a prudent businessman" 151 • 
The Italian courts have stated that, generally, directors cannot be held liable for their actions, 
provided that they acted with care, diligence and in a professional manner152 , while in Norway 
"the provisions of the Act [the Joint Stock Companies Act 1976] do not extend such general 
liability beyond negligence so that such a director or officer is not liable for poor business 
judgment resulting in loss. The distinction between poor judgment and negligence may be 
difficult to make and there is very little case law on the subject" 153 • 
It appears from the examples quoted that nowhere is the standard of care required of a director 
set at a very high level, and, if the Norwegian example is typical, the matter rarely comes 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
Corkery op cit 139-140; Jones op cit 110 - 111. 
Thomas Company Law in Europe (1992) p G/117 §348. 
Id p B/142 §368. 
Id p Dfl 14 §327. 
Id p E/130 §324. 
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before the courts. 
European Union law, if the proposed Fifth Directive on Company Law154 is adopted, will 
make significant changes to the position. The directive (which applies only to public 
companies or their equivalents) recommends, as a preference, the two-tier system of 
management. However, the proposals regarding liability of directors apply to both the 
supervisory and management organs - which may be equated to non-executive and executive 
directors respectively. In the preamble to the proposed Directive, the Council states that its 
starting point is that 
[T]he members of the management and supervisory organs must be made subject to special mies relating 
to civil liability which provide for joint and several liability, reverse the burden of proof for wrongful acts 
and ensure that the bringing of proceedings on behalf of the company for the purpose of making those 
persons liable is not improperly prevented. 
Article 14 of the proposed Directive provides that member sates shall make provision in their 
company legislation for 
(l) ... [C]ompensation ... for all drunages sustained by the company as a result of breaches of law or 
of the memorandmn or articles of association or of other wrongful acts committe.:l by the members 
of those organs in carrying out their duties. 
(2) Each member of the organ in question shall be jointly and severally liable without limit. He may, 
however, exonerate himself from liability if he proves that no fault is attributable to him 
personally. 
There has been a great deal of resistance to the proposed Fifth Directive by member states and 
it is by no means certain that it will be adopted in anything like its present form. Even if it 
is adopted, the effect on directors may not be as drastic as appears at first sight to be the case. 
Its apparent weakness lies in its failure to define "wrongful acts", and the interpretation of that 
concept would therefore be in terms of the law of the member state concerned - which may 
leave the position little changed. Once the wrongfulness of a board's act has been established, 
the requirement that a director will be liable unless he is able to exonerate himself does, 
however, reflect a significant change in emphasis. 
I~ Amended proposal for a Fifth Cotmcil Directive 91/C 321/09 (20 November 1991). See discussion 
on the effect on the director's duty of care and skill in Boyle AJ "Draft Fifth Directive: 
Implications for Directors' Duties, Board Stmcture and Employee Participation" (1992) 13 
Company Lawyer 6. 
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7 The director's duty of care in South Africa 
The concept of the onregmatige daad in South African law differs from the English tort of 
negligence, on which the action for a director's breach of his duty of care and skill is based. 155 
However, the English common law seems to have been adopted without question by the South 
African courts. Naude, in 1970, said: 
Tersaaklike Engelse vonnisse, en veral die locus c/assicus, In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] 
Ch 407, word sonder die minste huiwering deur bykans al die Suid-Afrikaanse skrywers as gesag behandel. 156 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen and Another, the nature of a 
director's duties was discussed, and Margo J said: 
To detennine whether there was negligence in any of the conduct alleged, it is necessary to have regard to 
relevant aspects of a director's duty of care and skill. In England certain principles have emerged from the 
decided cases on that duty. There has been a relative paucity of cases in South Africa, but the essential 
p1inciples of this branch of company law are the same, and the English cases provide valuable guidance ... 
The exient of a director's duty of care and skill depends to a considerable degree on the nature of the company's 
business and on any particular obligations assumed or assigned to him. See In re City Equitable Fire 
l11s11ra11ce Co 1925 Ch 407 at 427. Compare Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 (2) SA 
257 (W) at 267D-F. 157 
It might be assumed from the learned judge's description of the director's duty as depending on 
the nature of the company's business and his actual functions that the test of the degree of care 
required is an objective one, relating to the act performed rather than the actor. He reinforces this 
view by distinguishing between the executive and non-executive director: 
In that regard there is a difference between the so-called full-time or executive director, who participates in 
the day to day management of the company's affairs or of a portion thereof, and the non executive director who 
has not undertaken any special obligation. The latter is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs 
of his company. His duties are of an intennittent nature to be perfonned at periodical board meetings, and at 
any other meetings which may require his attention. he is not, however, bound to attend all such meetings, 
though he ought to whenever he is reasonably able to do so. 158 
In 1984, the case of Cronje NO v Stone examined the duty of care and the test for negligence and 
See Naude Die Ref?sposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur (1970) 159 et seq. On the concept of delict in 
relation to company officers, see Du Plessis JJ and Henning JJ "Die Deliktuele Aanspreeklikhei<l van 
Persone wat as Maastkappyorgane Optree" ( 1989) TSAR 540, or more generally on the basis of delictual 
liability, McKerron RG Law of Delict 7 ed (1974 and LAWSA 8.1 - 8.2. 
Id 160 fn 1. 
1980 (4) SA 156 fYV) 165E-G. See also Meskin PM He1wchsberg on the Companies Act 5 ed (1994) 460-
464; Cilliers et al Corporate Law 2 ed (1992) 142 -144; Pretorius et al Hah/.o 's South African Company Law 
through the Cases 5 ed (1991) 378-385. 
Id 165G-H. 
159 
160 
161 
162 
Page 32 
came to the conclusion that it was perhaps not as objective as Margo J had considered it: 
[E]k dink dit is die regte benadering, dat 'n Hof, wanneer hy iemand se nalatigheid moet heoordecl homself 
tot 'n mate m die posisie van daardie persoon moct stcl, en, hoewcl dit nie 'n subjektiewe oordeel is nie, mecn 
ek moct 'n I !of homsclf plaas in die posisie van die redelike persoon met dieselfde agtergrond en 
opvoedingskwalifikasies as die een wat hy moet beoordeel. 150 
However, this case was somewhat unusual in that it in fact applied a much higher standard of 
attention to the duties required of a director, and found the defendant personally liable for the 
company's debts in a case where she had played no part in the company's management, but was 
found by the court to have made insufficient enquiry as to the state of its financial affairs. This 
judgment, which has been criticised by some writers160, should probably, in the light of the 
subsequent attitude of the courts, be regarded as an aberration. 
Most of the reported South African cases in which it was sought to hold a director liable for 
negligence have been in the context of a claim under s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
which empowers the court to impose personal liability on a director who has been a party to the 
carrying on of business by the company either fraudulently or recklessly. The provision 
corresponds generally with s 214 of the English Insolvency Act, 1986 (which refers to "wrongful 
trading"). 161 The scope of the South African section is however wider than that of its English 
counterpart in that it is not necessary for a company to be in insolvent liquidation for its 
provisions to be applied. Although dealing with a statutory provision, the courts have applied 
common law principles in establishing the test for negligence, which are based on the same 
considerations as negligence constituting a breach of the duty of car. In Ex parte Lehowa 
Development Cmporation Ltd, Stegmann J said: 
'[R]ccklessly' implies the existence of the ohjective standard of care that would he ohserved hy the reasonable 
mm1 in conducting the business of the company in the particular circumstances. A departure from that standard 
constitutes negligence, a more serious dcpat1ure gross negligence, which, in the context of the section, is the 
same as recklessness. 162 
The duty of care was described further by Goldstone JA in Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO; 
1985 (3) SA 597 (T) 613E-F. 
See Luiz SM "Extending the Liability of Directors" (1988) 105 SAL.I 788. 
See ahove p 23. 
1989 (2) SA 71 (T) 11 !C-D. 
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the learned judge disagreed to some extent with Margo Jin Fisheries Development, and held that 
it was 
... unhdpfi.il and even misleading to classify company directors as 'executive' or 'non-executive' for purposes 
of a'>Certaining their duties to the company or when any specific or affirmative action is required of them. No 
such distinction is to he found in any statute. At common law, once a person accepts an appointment as a 
director, he becomes a fiduciary in relation to the company ... Whether the inquiry be one in relation to 
negligence, reckless conduct or fraud, the legal rules are the same for all directors. In the application of those 
rules to the facts one must obviously take into account, for example, the factors referred to in the judgment of 
Margo J in the Fisheries Development case and any others which may he relevant in judging the conduct of 
the director. 163 
Although superficially it might appear that the standard of conduct required of a director is judged 
by a more objective standard in South Africa, this stricter interpretation of the common law is 
generally illusory. Over the past four years, certain courts have attempted to apply more stringent 
tests of the conduct of directors, particularly in relation to the application of the provisions of ss 
423-425 of the Companies Act. 164 Other courts have taken a contrary view, basing their decisions 
on the practical aspects of managing a company. 165 The Appellate Division has followed the latter 
path, leaving the duty of care imposed on directors at its former low level. 166 
The duty of care has never been generally codified in South Africa. The only reference in a statute 
is in the Banks Act 94of1990, s60(2)(b) of which provides: 
[a director) shall, in the peiiomrnnce of his fi.mctions as a director of such hank or controlling company, 
observe such guide-lines and comply with such requirements as may he prescribed under s 90( l )(b ). 
Section 90(1)(b) empowers the Minister to make regulations: 
providing guidelines relating to the conduct of, and prescribing requirements to he complied with hy, a 
member of the hoard or directors of a hank in the peiionnance of his fonctions as such a director~ 
The relevant provisions are to be found in regulation 11 - Guidelines relating to Conduct of 
Directors, which states, inter a/ia: 
1991 (2) SA 660 678A-D. 
See eg Ex parre lehowa Develop111en1 Corpomrio11 Lrd 1989 (3) SA 7 l (T); Ex parte De Villiers NO: In re 
MSL Puhlicatiom (Pry) Lrd (!II Liquidario11) 1990 (4) SA 59 CW); ex parte De Villiers mu/ Anorher NNO: 
In re Carbon Developments (Pry) Ltd (l11 Liqui1lation) 1992 (2) SA 95 CW). 
Ex parte S{lydo111 NO: In re Ce1ural Plumhi11g Worh (Pry) Lui (l11 liquidation) 1988 ( 1) SA 616 (D); Cooper 
v A&G Fa1·hio11S (Pry) Ltd: Ex parte Millman NO 1991 (4) SA 204 (C); Ozinsky NO v Lloyd 1992 (3) SA 
396 (C). 
In overturning the Transvaal Provincial Division's judgment in Carbon Developments 1993 (I) SA 493 (A) 
and upholding the Cape Provincial Division in Oz.insky v Lloyd 1995 (2) SA 915 (A). 
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( l) Every director of a bank or a controlling company shall, in the performance of his functions as such 
a director, observe the following guidelines 
(a) In view of the fact that a hank is a public company incorporated and registered under the 
Companies Act, every director of a bank shall as far as reasonably possible he conversant with such 
provisions of the Companies Act, other statutes and the common law as directly or indirectly relate 
to the powers and duties of a director of a company. 
(c) A director of a hank shall perform his duties as such a director with diligence and care and with 
such a degree of competence as can reasonably be expected from a person with his knowledge and 
experience. 167 
Even here the test is still a subjective one, but at least the supervisory process employed by the 
Registrar in vetting the appointment of bank directors, involving the submission of a detailed 
c11rric11!11m vitae, ensures that the level of knowledge and experience referred to is appropriate 
to the appointment. 
Neither has the business judgment rule been specifically recognised by our courts. There are 
however a number of statements which suggest that the courts in fact follow the same principles 
as their American counterparts. In Robinson v Imroth and Others the court said: 
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that the Court will not interfere with 
internal management of companies acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. 168 
In 1927, the same court said: 
It is a well-established principle that Courts of Law will not interfere with the internal management of 
companies, except in circumstances which are not present in this case. 100 
More recently, the Witwatersrand Local Division reiterated its view of the subject: 
In general, the policy of the Courts has been not to interfere in the internal domestic affairs of a company, 
where the company ought to he able to adjust its affairs itself by appropriate resolutions of a majority of the 
shareholders. 170 
In the Fisheries Development case, Margo J held that "[a] director is not liable for mere errors 
GN 2799 of 30 November 1990. 
1917 WLD 159 168. 
Maynard v Office Appliances (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1927 WLD 290 293. 
Ye1Ule v Orl.mulo Coal Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others 1961 (3) SA 314 (W) 316. 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
Page 35 
of judgment. "171 The court was clearly following English precedent, as it included in the 
authorities cited the City Equitahle, 172 Brazilian Ruhher, 173 and Lagunas Nitrate 174 cases. 
The most recent development in South African Law has been the publication of the King 
Report. 175 The Comrnitte on Corporate Governance was established by the Institute of Directors 
in Southern Africa under the chairmanship of ME King SC. The terms of reference of the 
Committe were: 
To consider and make recommendations on a Code of Practice on the financial 
aspects of corporate governance in South Africa. 
2 To strive to recommend simpler reporting without sacrificing the quality of 
information. 
3 To lay down guidelines for ethical practices in business enterprises in South 
Africa. 
4 To have regard, in applying its terms of reference, to the special circumstances 
existing in South Africa, more particularly the entrance into the business 
community of members of disadvantaged communities. 176 
The report deals somewhat superficially with the duty of care and skill; it merely states 
"[d]irectors must exercise the care and skill which reasonably can be expected of a person of their 
expertise" 177 without attempting to define any of the terms used. This in effect seems a slightly 
more objective standard than the one currently applied. The report goes on to say: 
Pm1icularly in the case of non-executive directors, their appointment is onerous in the context of the present 
tests of a hreach of the duty of care and skill. 178 
1980 (4) SA 171 (W) 166B. 
[1925] Ch 407 429. 
[1911] l Ch425437. 
[1899] 2 Ch 392 435. 
Institute of Directors 171e King Report on Corporate Governance (1994). 
Report Appendix IL 
Chapter 5 ~2.10. 
Id §3.3. 
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For the first time, a specific reference is made to the business judgment rule: 
It seems to us that a director should not be liable for a breach of the duty of care and skill if they [sic] have 
exercised a business judgment in good faith in a matter in which the undermentioned three criteria are 
satisfied, viz: 
I that the decision is an informed one based on all the facts of the case; and 
2 that the decision is a rational one; and 
3 that there is no self-interest. 179 
It is interesting to note that this is the only recommendation the report makes in respect of the 
duty of care and skill. The Code of Corporate Practice, the level of compliance with which is now 
required to be reported in a listed company's annual financial statements180 makes no reference to 
the duty. 
8 Summary and Conclusions 
It is clear that the principles underlying the business judgment rule have been recognized by 
the South African courts, at least by implication, and that the reluctance of the courts to 
interfere in the management of companies is well established. 181 It is equally clear that the 
enforcement of a director's liability for a breach of his duty of care and skill remains at a level 
which, although it has perhaps become slightly stricter in recent years, certainly does not 
justify King's comment that "[the] appointment is onerous in the context of the present tests 
of a breach of the duty of care and skill." 182 This comment is reminiscent of the reaction of 
organised business in America to the Trans Union case. 183 Although King recommends the 
introduction of the business judgment rule into the Companies Act, no discussion is reported, 
nor any recommendation made, with regard to the stricter enforcement - or the legislation -
Id §3.4 and recommendation 12, which is worded: 
"In order to encourage entrepreneurship and the acceptance of appointments as non-
executive directors, a director should not incur liability for a breach of duty of care and 
skill where they [sic) have exercised a business judgment in good faith in a matter in 
which the decision is an infom1ed and rational one and there is no self-interest." 
JSE Listings Requirements (2nd issue September 1995) §8.52(a). 
Seep 35. 
Chapter 5 §3.3. 
Smith v Vmi Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985) supra 7 - 8. 
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of an appropriate standard of conduct on the part of the director. Without such sanctions being 
applied as a regular occurrence, there would appear to be no need for the business judgment 
rule. 
It seems that there is no legal system which has codified the business judgment rule. The 
provisions in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act184 which deal with the director's 
duty of care and skill, any reference to the business judgment rule was omitted as the 
committee was unable, after lengthy debate, to agree on a suitable draft. The provisions 
contained in paragraph 4.0l(c) of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance 185 are a lone attempt to commit the rule to words - and that attempt is also not 
without its critics. The American authorities, generally, have preferred to allow the rule to 
be developed by the courts, and such development remains an ongoing process. 
The American approach appears to be the correct one. It seems unrealistic to talk of codifying 
the business judgment rule in a jurisdiction which is not by any means clear as to the extent 
of a director's duty of care. There is no need for a safe harbour186 against a storm whose 
threat is largely illusory. 
supra 18 - 19. 
supra 19 - 20. 
186 See note 98 at p 18. 
